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We study whether the information patients have about physician quality when they choose a 
physician, influences their probability of switching physicians. We also study whether a physician 
with unfavorable characteristics, as perceived by patients (ex post), can compensate for patient 
switching by providing a higher quantity of services to his patients. If so, a trade-off exists between 
quality characteristics and quantity of services in the physician services market. From panel data 
covering the entire population of Norwegian general practitioners, we find that information on 
physician quality, as perceived by patients, has a huge effect on the volume of patients switching 
physicians. We also find that although physicians who experience patient shortages in general provide 
more services to their patients than physicians who have enough patients, the increased level of service 
provision only has a very small impact on the number of patients who decide to switch. We conclude 
that a higher level of service provision does not seem to compensate for negative characteristics 
(patients’ impression of competence, empathy etc) of less popular physicians. We suggest that 
information about the volume of patient switching at the physician practice level should be made 
public.  
 
JEL Classification: H42; I11; I18 
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We study whether the information patients have about physician quality when they choose a 
physician, influences their probability of switching physicians. We also study whether a 
physician with unfavorable characteristics as perceived by patients (ex post) can compensate 
by providing a higher quantity of services to his or her patients. If so, a trade-off exists 
between quality characteristics and quantity of services in the physician services market. 
 
This issue is related to Gravelle and Masiero (2000), who develop a theory of patients who 
switch physicians when they gain updated information about physician quality.  They 
introduce two groups of patients: young and old. Young patients sign up with a general 
practitioner (GP) for the first time, and have imperfect information about quality. Old patients 
are already listed and know at the end of the first period the true quality of their GP, and 
hence, whether they underestimated or overestimated the quality when they were young. Old 
patients, however, are assumed to have no more information about other GPs than they had 
when they were young. Those who underestimated the quality of their GP, decide to stay with 
the physician. Those who overestimated their GP, decide to switch if the expected benefit 
exceeds the switching cost.  
 
An implication of Gravelle and Masiero (2000) is that more information about physician 
quality when choosing a GP makes it less likely that patients switch physicians. We are able 
to test this implication empirically with data from the Norwegian regular general practitioner 
scheme (list patient system) introduced in 2001. The scheme implies that all residents are 
offered registration with a general practitioner and every general practitioner is given a list of 
patients to serve. Both among residents and general practitioners there is close to 100 percent 
participation in the new system. When the list patient system was established, physicians with 
enough patients got lists that consisted of patients who had this particular physician as their 
first choice. If the number of people who wanted to be listed with a GP exceeded the GP’s 
preferred list size, priority was given to people who had been with the GP for a long time. 
These people were likely to be well informed about their GP’s quality and hence, not likely to 
switch to another GP. Alternatively, for physicians with a shortage (deficit) of patients only 
60 percent of the patients had their GP as the first choice. About 30 percent of the patients had 
not expressed preference for a physician and were assigned a physician administratively.  
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These patients initially had less knowledge of their GP’s quality. Hence, we have a positive 
relationship between patients’ quality information and the proportion of patients on a GP’s list 
who have this GP as their first choice, and a positive relationship between this proportion and 
the probability that the GP has enough patients.  An implication is that GPs, who experience a 
patient shortage, are likely to have patients with less quality information.  In Section 2 we 
construct a small model that elaborates on how patient shortage and quality information are 
related to the occurrence of patients switching physicians. The model also takes account of the 
possibility that the number of services a physician offers to his patients can have an impact on 
the number of switches he experiences.   
 
The predictions from the model are compatible with Lurås (2007), who surveys a 
representative sample of Norwegians about whether or not they are satisfied with the GPs 
with whom they are listed. The responses to the survey are linked with some basic 
information about the physician with whom a person is listed. The survey reveals that being 
listed with a GP who experiences a shortage (deficit) of patients adds to the probability of 
being dissatisfied with the physicians’ medical skills, interpersonal skills, referral practice and 
consultation length. But will dissatisfaction expressed by residents in a survey carry over to 
decisions about actually switching physicians? This is not obvious since in Hirschman’s 
(1970) terms: while dissatisfaction is ‘voice’, switching is ‘exit’ and requires an alternative 
provider that is considered as better than the present one.  
 
The literature on switching costs suggests that dissatisfaction may not result in actual 
switching. Klemperer (1995) summarizes some reasons. Of particular importance for our 
issue are: 
•  Transaction costs of switching suppliers: A person who considers switching must 
collect information about available physicians in his or her municipality and also do 
the administrative work related to the actual switching
1.  
•  Costing of learning to use new brands: The present physician would have a lot of 
patient history information, while a new physician would need to acquire much of this 
information from the patient. Similarly, a relationship of mutual trust between 
physician and patient requires investments from both sides. 
                                                 
1 The last item is now made easier for people with Internet connections. Since 2005 they can simply log into 
their personal page at the National Insurance Administration’s Web page and make the switch online. 
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•  Psychological cost of switching or non-economic ‘brand-loyalty: Some patients would 
perhaps feel that they will disappoint their present physicians if they switch.  
•  Uncertainty of the quality of untested brands: Physician services are experience goods 
in the sense that the quality for the individual patient is not actually revealed before an 
episode of illness occurs. This means that, even with extensive market search before 
making a switch, there is always uncertainty about the quality of an untested 
physician.    
Hence, it is interesting to study empirically whether dissatisfaction, as expressed in surveys, 
in fact has consequences for actual switching.  
 
In this study we have access to register data on patient switching, and we reveal patients’ 
preferences by studying actual patient switching at the physician practice level. In addition to 
studying the effect of GP characteristics, we also explore to what extent physicians who 
experience a shortage of patients in fact manage to compensate for their less favorable 
characteristics by providing better accessibility and by offering more health care services to 
their patients. Physician behavior is elaborated on in Section 2, where a model that underlies 
the hypotheses to be tested, is presented. Section 3 presents data and some descriptive 
statistics. Empirical methods and results are presented in Section 4, while Section 5 concludes 
the paper. Our results show that both a small proportion of patients on the list having the GP 
as their first choice when the list patient system was introduced, and an experience of patient 
shortage (deficit) both result in more patient switching. Although physicians with a patient 
shortage in general provide more services to their patients compared with physicians who 
have enough patients, we find that the increased level of service provision only has a very 
small impact on the number of patients who decide to switch. We conclude that a higher level 
of service provision does not seem to compensate for characteristics of physicians that 
patients dislike.  
 
 
2. The model 
We suggest a small model of physician behavior and patients’ switching behavior. Our 
approach stems from the observation of variation in practice style among physicians. For a 
number of encounters between a GP and his patient it is not clear what constitutes ‘the right 
medical treatment’. An interesting consequence of the lack of medical standards is that  
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several practice profiles are all regarded as satisfactory from a professional point of view. We 




There are two groups of patients: Group A, listed with their preferred GP and Group B, 
consisting of all other patients. The probability that a patient of group A switches GP is 
denoted pA, and is for our purpose considered as exogenous. The probability that a patient of 
group B switches, is denoted as pB(k), and is assumed to depend on k, the number of health 
services being provided at the GP’s discretion. Given a GP’s exogenous characteristics, we 
assume that more services provided add to patients’ satisfaction and hence, may lower the 
probability of patient switching among patients in group B:   ( ) 0, ( ) 0, ( ) 0 BB pk pk p ′ ′′ ≤ ≥∞ > . 
We also assume and  A B p p <  for all values of k. For simplicity, we consider the flow demand 
for being added to a GP’s list as an exogenous variable, denoted z and equal across all GPs. 
Furthermore, ni (i = A, B) denotes the stock of patients listed such that nA + nB = n. Eq. (1) 
expresses steady state, where the number of patients switching out of a list 
(i.e. ( ) A AB B p np k n + ) is equal to the number of patients added to the list, which is less than or 
equal to the flow demand for being added to the list (z). Strict inequality means that some 
patients are rationed in the sense that their preference for being listed with a particular GP is 
not fulfilled:  
() AA B B p np k nz +≤    (1) 
We assume that physicians maximize a quasi-linear utility function in monetary terms, 
c+v(l), where c is income (all income is consumed) and l is leisure and that v´(l)>0 and 
v´´(l)<0. The net income from the physician’s practice is defined as () qn rn k α ++ , where q 
is a capitation payment per person on the physician’s list, r is the fee per item of health 
service (or equivalently, a fee-for-service), and n is the number of listed patients. The lowest 
acceptable level of service provision is denoted byα . As an acceptable simplification for our 
purpose, we assume identical need for services among the physician’s population of patients. 
The greater the need parameter is, the greater the minimum acceptable level of service 
provision. Health service provision above α, k, is provided at the physician’s discretion. The 
definition of leisure is  ( )) Tt n k α −+ , where T is the exogenous total time endowment and t is 
an exogenously given time cost  related to each service (consultation). The physician’s 
                                                 
2 Iversen and Lurås (2000) elaborate on this argument.  
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practice profile is characterized by the length of the list and the number of services per listed 
person. The physician maximizes a constrained quasi-linear utility function: 
 
 





Max qn rn k v T tn k
st
pn p kn z




The constraint says that the number of patients should be maintained in the long run, i.e. 
steady state is assumed.  
 
We can differentiate among three groups of GPs in steady state:  
Type I:  AA p nz ≤ : 
This group consists of very popular GPs, in the sense that the entire list is made up of 
individuals having this particular GP as their first choice (i.e. nA>0, nB=0). Optimal number of 
patients and service provision for this group is found by maximizing (2) unconstrained: 
  
, () [ () ]
A
AA A nk Max qn rn k v T tn k α α ++ + −+    (3) 
 
First order conditions for a maximum are: 
 
[´ ( ) ]0 A rv t n −≤ l    (4) 
[( ) ] () 0 qrv t k α ′ +− += l    (5) 
where the lhs of (4) is the GP’s utility from an additional consultation and the lhs of (5) 
expresses his or her utility from an additional person listed. From (5) we see that 
[( ) ] 0 rv t ′ −< l . The lhs of (4) is then negative, and accordingly k=0. This GP experiences an 
excess demand of people who prefer to be listed with him or her. Since the capitation fee is 
positive, it is always more rewarding for the GP to add new people to the list than to increase 
the level of service provision to those already listed
3. Hence, k=0, and the minimum service 
intensity is offered.  
 
Neither of the remaining two types of GPs achieve their optimal number of patients only from 
Group A. Hence, they have nA ≥ 0 and nB > 0. 
                                                 
3 In Iversen and Lurås (2000) we show that this may not be true with more than one type of service, if relative 
fees deviate too much from relative costs of providing them.   
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In steady state we then have: 
() AA B B p np k nz +=    (6) 
Eq. (6) determines nB as a function of nA, z and k: 
 
(, , ) BB A nn n z k
+ + −
=    (7) 
where the signs below the function arguments denote the sign of the partial derivative. The 
optimal values of k and nB in steady state are now found by maximizing: 
 
() () ( ) [ () ( ) ]
..
(, , )
AB AB AB k
BB A
Ma x q nn r nn kv T t nn k
st
nn n z k
α α ++ + + +− + +
=
     (8) 
 
The first order condition for a maximum of (8) is: 
[ ( )] ( ) [( )] 0 Bk Bk rn r k q n v t n k n α α ′′ ′ ++ +− + + ≤ l        ( 9 )  
where  Bk n′ is the partial derivative of nB with respect to k. 
 
We can now distinguish between Type 2 and Type 3. 
 
Type 2: (0) AA B B p np nz += : 
The first term in (9) measures the income from providing extra services to the people already 
listed. The second term measures the income from additional patients who are attracted to the 
list because of the increased level of services provision. The third term of (9) (after the minus 
sign) measures the loss in utility related to the increase in working time. This GP may be 
content with his number of patients, in which case (9) is fulfilled with equality for k = 0. 
Alternatively, he may also have preferred more patients, higher income, and less leisure given 
that k=0. But since k must be greater than zero to attract more patients, the income from 
providing more services is considered to be too small to compensate for the loss of leisure. 
Hence, the lhs of (9) is still equal to zero for k = 0 but the GP now experiences a shortage of 
patients. This is typically expected to happen if the difference between the preferred and 
actual number of patients is small, if q is small relative to the fee-for-service component, or if 




Type 3: High service intensity;   () AA B B p np k nz + =  and k>0: 
A type 3 physician is characterized by marginal utility from income exceeding the marginal 
disutility from work at k = 0. Hence, (9) is fulfilled with equality for k > 0.       
 
We summarize the results with regard to the volume of switching: 
Type 1 physicians have only patients who have this particular physician as their first choice, 
i.e.  A n > 0 and nB  = 0. In this case patients are rationed in the sense that not everyone who 
would have preferred to be listed with a Type 1 GP is admitted.  Type 2 and type 3 have in 
common that  A n0   ≥ and nB > 0. Since  BA p p > , the number of patients switching out is 
higher in steady state for type 2 and type 3 than for type 1. Since the inflow of patients is 
considered exogenous and equal for both types, the flow of patients switching out is not 
expected to differ between type 2 and type 3. The amount of switching adjusted for the 
number of patients will however differ. The proportion of switching out of a list can in steady 




.  Since type 3, because of more service intensive practice style, 
has a higher stock of patients compared with type 2, the denominator is higher for type 3 than 
for type 2. It follows that the flow of switching out adjusted for list size is predicted to be 
greater for type 2 than for type 3.  
 
The following hypotheses emerge from the model and will be tested empirically: 
•  An increase in the proportion of a list having expressed  the GP as the first choice, 
results in less switching out of the list 
•  A shortage of patients increases the number switching out of the list 
•   An increase in the level of service provision results in less switching out of the list for 
a GP who experiences a shortage of patients 
 
 
3. Data and descriptives 
 
This study exploits data from the Norwegian list patient system. Norway has a national health 
service financed by general taxation. For an average GP, 30 percent of the practice income is 
expected to come from the capitation fee, and the remaining 70 percent is split rather equally 
between co-payments from patients and fees from the insurance. Prior to the implementation  
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of the list patient system in 2001, all Norwegian residents (4.5 million) were given the 
opportunity to complete and return a form to the National Insurance Administration (NIA), 
stating three preferred GPs in descending order. GPs, on the other hand, informed the NIA of 
their preferred number of patients. In the next step inhabitants and GPs were matched at the 
level of municipality according to an allocation algorithm made for the purpose. If the 
preferred number of patients stated by a GP was smaller than the number of residents who 
wanted to be listed with him or her, priority was given to former and current patients 
according to the stated number of years with the physician. After the first round of 
assignments, a considerable number of the GPs ended up with a smaller number of patients 
than they preferred. On the other hand, approximately 30 percent of the population had not 
expressed a preference for a particular GP. These people were assigned to the GPs who still 
had spare capacity, but even after the final round a considerable proportion of the GPs had not 
reached their preferred list size.   
 
According to regulation, patients are allowed to switch GPs a maximum of twice a year. The 
switching is organized by the NIA, and a patient may switch by coming to a local branch of 
the NIA, by calling, or (from 2005 and onwards) by visiting the Internet page: 
https://is.trygdeetaten.no/rtv-minfastlege/innbygger/visloginside.do. 
 
There may be several explanations for switching physicians.  The database from NIA 
distinguishes between patient switching initiated by the physician because a GP has reduced 
or ended his practice, and patient switching initiated by the patient because the person has 
moved from the municipality, because of ‘an ordinary switch’ and because of ‘other reasons’. 
Among the possible reasons listed in the NIA database for switching physicians, we conclude 
that patient dissatisfaction is best captured by “ordinary switch” and “other reasons.” Because 
we are particularly interested in studying the number of switches due to patient 
dissatisfaction, we denote people who leave a list because of these reasons as the number of 
people who switch physicians. Annually about three percent of people on an average list 
switch physicians because of these reasons. This is more than the 1.5 percent that is reported 
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Figure 1 No. switching out the list according to year and proportion of the list who have 
the GP as their first choice (No. observations = 10,239) 
 
  
Figure 1 shows a boxplot
4 of the number of patients switching physicians according to year, 
and the proportion of the list who had the GP as their first choice when the system was 
introduced. The term Small refers to GPs with 50 percent or less of the list consisting of 
patients who have the GP as their first choice. The term Medium refers to a proportion 
between 50 percent and 75 percent, and Large means more that 75 percent
5. We see from 
Figure 1 that the distribution of switching is according to the predictions from the theoretical 
model: A Large proportion of patients who have preferred to be listed with a GP is mirrored 




                                                 
4 Observations in the box are between the 25th percentile and the 75th percentile 
5 The composition of GPs is 18 percent Small, 18 percent Medium and 64 percent Large.  
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Figure 2 GPs according to list status (No. GPs = 2570) 
 
 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of GPs according to list status and year
6. GPs are divided into 
three groups: Those with a discrepancy of at least 100 between preferred and actual list size 
are said to experience a shortage of patients and are denominated as Short. Those with a 
discrepancy between preferred and actual list between zero and 100 patients represent a gray 
area in the sense that we do not really know whether they consider the discrepancy to be 
costly to them. According to local health authorities some GPs should have open lists to offer 
new residents a choice of GP and also to offer an alternative option for those residents who 
are dissatisfied with their present GPs. Some GPs may then have open lists because they feel 
obliged to contribute to an actual choice for the population. That means they are probably 
rather indifferent between having the current list and having some additional patients. This 
group of physicians is denominated as Gray in Figure 2. The third group, denominated Full, 
                                                 
6 A total number of 3650 GPs contracted with the regular general practitioner scheme when the system was 
introduced. We exclude from the analysis those GPs who ended the contract since system was introduced and the 
approximately ten per cent of the GPs who are public employees. We also exclude 155 GPs who participated in a 
trial that preceded the nationwide regular general practitioner scheme. This leaves us with a panel of 2570 GPs.  
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consists of those GPs with actual lists equal to or greater than their preferred lists
7. From 
Figure 2 we see that the percentage of GPs who experience a shortage of patients steadily 
declines from 33 percent in 2001 to 21 percent in 2004. Also, the proportion with full lists 
declines somewhat, from 30 percent in 2001 to 26 percent in 2004. These declines are 
balanced by an increase in the proportion of GPs in the gray area from 37 percent to 54 
percent during the period. A more detailed description of transitions between states shows that 
22 percent of the GPs who were Short in the previous period are Gray or Full in this period, 
while only three percent of those who were Gray or Full in the previous period end up as 
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Figure 3  No. switching out of a list  according to year and GP’s list status (No. 
observations = 10,261) 
 
 
Figure 3 shows a box plot of the annual number of people who switch physician according to 
year and a GP’s list status. We see that the mean number of people who leave a list (shown by 
the vertical line inside the boxes) is greater for Short than for Gray and greater for Gray than 
                                                 
7 Only 5-6 percent of the physicians have a list that is greater than their preferred.  
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for Full in all years. We also see that after 2001 for each of the three subgroups the mean 
number of people who switch is quite stable from one year to the next. In 2004, an average of 
21 people switched from the list of a Full GP, on average 35 from a Gray GP, and on average 
55 from a Short GP. We have also plotted the mean number of people who are added to the 
lists according to year and list status of the GPs (Figure A1 in the appendix). We find that the 
mean numbers are rather stable after 2001 within each group, and that relative additions 
according to groups are similar to the relative switches, as described in Figure 3. Hence, a 
tendency towards steady-state is suggested
8.    
 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the panel as a whole, while Table 2 shows the 
descriptives according to the GPs’ list status: Full, Gray, or Short. The last two columns of 
Table 1 decompose the standard deviation into the variation between the average of 
observations of GPs (between) and the variation over time (within) for the individual GP. 
Variables are grouped according to variables that characterize the patient list, variables that 
characterize the GP’s practice profile, variables that characterize the GP and finally, variables 
that characterize the municipality a GP practices in.  
 
The mean size of a list is 1,270 people. We see that the between variation accounts for 85 
percent of the total variation. From Table 2 we see that the mean list size for the three groups 
differs with a magnitude of about 100 patients, with Full having the longest lists.  Proplist is a 
time-independent variable that shows the number of persons having a particular GP as their 
first choice when the list system was established relative to the size of a GP’s patient list. 
Table 1 shows that for GPs as a whole this proportion is 80, but from Table 2 we see that the 
proportion varies considerably between the three groups. While Full was the first choice for 
the entire list of patients, only 61 percent of the patients on a Short list had their GP as first 
choice.  
 
We see from Table 1 that on average 12 percent of the patients on a list are 70 years or older 
and 51 percent are females. We also see that 90 percent of the variation in the composition of 
the list according to age and gender is due to variation between physicians. From Table 2 we 
see that the three groups are quite similar with regard to the proportion of elderly listed, while 
there are differences regarding the proportion of females, with Full having the greatest  
                                                 
8 As explained previously, Figures 1 and 3 only describe the numbers who switch physician because of assumed 
dissatisfaction with the physician.   
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics for the panel 
 
Variable Definition  mean  std. 
 
min max  b  w 
The list 
Switch  Annual no. switching (# obs 
=10239) 
43.1 43.8 0 956 0.54  0.46
List  The size of the list in terms of 
1000 people listed (#obs 
=10171) 
1.270 0.380 0.121 2.832 0.85  0.15
Proplist  The number of people having 
the GP as their first choice as a 
proportion of the GP’s list 
January 1
st 2002 (#obs=2326) 
0.85 0.35 0.003 3.2 1  0
Propold  The proportion of persons aged 
70 and older on the list (# obs = 
9978) 
0.12 0.06 0 0.42 0.90  0.10
Propfem  The proportion of females on the 
list (# obs =10117) 
0.51 0.10 0.15 0.91 0.90  0.10
The practice profile 
Feepercap  Mean annual income in NOK 
from fees paid by insurance per 
listed person (# obs (2002-2004) 
= 7597) 
434.0 207.9 0 4378.0 0.71  0.29
Consult  Mean no. of consultations per 
1000 listed during one month (# 
obs = 4209) 
214.4 84.7 0.6 1102 0.66  0.34
Duration  Mean no. of consultations per 
1,000 listed where duration 
dependent fee is used during one 
month (# obs = 4191) 
63.0 47.0 0.6 612.4 0.73  0.27
The GP 
Male  A dummy variable equal to one 
if the physician is a male (# obs 
=2570) 
0.73 0 1 1  0
Age  The GP’s age in years in 2001 (# 
obs =2570) 
46.7 8.05 26 71 1  0
Specialist1  A dummy variable equal to one 
if the physician is a specialist in 
general medicine in 2001 (# obs 
= 2570) 
0.58 0 1 1  0
Specialist2  A dummy variable equal to one 
if the physician is a specialist in 
community in 2001 medicine  
(#obs =2570) 
0.08 0 1 1  0
Norwegian  The GP is Norwegian citizen  0.91 0 1  1  0
The municipality 
Capacity  # GPs who accept new patients 
(#obs =10182 
61.3 111.7 0 341 0.94  0.06
Population  Residents of the municipality in 
1000 (# obs = 10280) 
111.2 175.2 0.7 529.9 0.99  0.01
b (w) is between (within) physician variation as a proportion of total variation 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics according to physicians’ list status 
 
Full = 1 
(preferred - 
actual ≤ 0) 
Gray = 1 






Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std 
The list 
Switch  Annual no. switching (# obs 
=10239) 
23.3 24.6 38.8 33.0 69.8  58.7
List  The size of the list in terms of 
1000 people listed (# obs 
=10171) 
1.367 0.376 1.270 0.377 1.172  0.365
Proplist  The number of people having 
the GP as their first choice as a 
proportion of the GP’s list 
January 1
st 2002 (# obs =2326) 
1.08 0.34 0.82 0.29 0.61  0.27
Propold  The proportion of persons 
aged 70 and older on the list (# 
obs = 9978) 
0.12 0.06 0.12 0.06 0.12  0.06
Propfem  The proportion of females on 
the list (# obs =10117) 
0.55 0.11 0.51 0.09 0.47  0.08
The practice profile 
Feepercap  Mean annual income in NOK 
from fees paid by insurance 
per listed person (# obs = 
7597) 
435.4 169.9 420.9 188.3 457.3  269.7
Consult  Mean no. of consultations per 
1000 listed during one month 
(# obs = 4209) 
209.6 72.7 211.5 81.9 224.6 99.2
Duration  Mean no. of consultations per 
1,000 listed where duration 
dependent fee is used during 
one month (# obs = 4191) 
58.4 43.3 62.0 43.2 69.8  55.9
The GP 
Male  A dummy variable equal to 
one if the physician is a male 
(# obs =2570) 
0.66 0.70  0.84 
Age  The GP’s age in years (# obs 
=10900) 
47.1 7.0 46.3 8.3 46.8 8.6
Specialist1  A dummy variable equal to 
one if the physician is a 
specialist in general medicine 
(# obs = 2570) 
0.68 0.56  0.50 
Specialist2  A dummy variable equal to 
one if the physician is a 
specialist in community 
medicine  (# obs =2570) 
0.07 0.09  0.08 
Norwegian  The GP is Norwegian citizen  0.94 0.92   0.85 
The municipality 
Capacity  No. of GPs in the municipality 
who accept new patients (# 
obs =10182) 
30.3 73.7 58.6 110.4 95.6  132.8
Population  Population of the municipality 
in 1000 (# obs = 10280) 
67 119 109 175 159  207 
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proportion. Because we know that females prefer to be listed with female physicians this is 
probably related to the fact that, while female GPs account for 33 percent of Full, they only 
account for 17 percent of Short.  
 
Feepercap  shows the mean annual income in NOK
9 from National Insurance per listed 
person
10. The figures are adjusted for annual changes in fee level by simply using the 
development of the consultation fee as a deflator. Figures are from 2002-2004. The year of 
2001 is disregarded, since the system was only in operation for about half of that year. For the 
whole panel the mean income per listed person per year from fees paid by insurance is NOK 
434. In addition to this sum, the GP receives an annual capitation fee (NOK 300 in 2004) and 
income from patient co-payment (NOK 117 per consultation in 2004).  Table 2 shows a 
distinct difference in Feepercap between the three groups of GPs, with Short having the 
highest income per listed person. This is in accordance with our prediction from theory in 
Section 2, and is also supported empirically in Iversen (2005).  According to the fee schedule, 
a GP receives an additional fee for every 15 minutes a consultation lasts beyond the first 20 
minutes.  For a GP with a shortage of patients, there are incentives for providing both more 
and longer consultations, compared with a GP with enough patients. From Table 2 we see that 
the mean number of  (long) consultations per person listed in fact is higher for short than for 
full. This result is also supported by more thorough analysis reported in Iversen (2005).  
 
After having fulfilled a particular post-graduate education program, a physician becomes a 
specialist in general medicine. Hence, being a specialist in general medicine may be 
considered a quality indicator attached to a GP.  From Table 1 we see that 58 percent of the 
GPs are specialists in general medicine and from Table 2 we see a considerable difference 
between the subgroups of GPs with 68 percent of Full being specialists, while only 50 percent 
of Short have a similar specialization.  
 
Capacity shows the number of GPs in a particular municipality who will accept new patients, 
i.e. the number of GPs that are available. On average, a GP is surrounded by 61.3 GPs with 
open lists in his or her municipality. We see from Table 2 that this figure varies greatly 
                                                 
9 One USD is about NOK 5.00.  
10 Compared to the claims data from NIA all service provision figures are reduced by 5 percent for full and gray 
and by 10 percent for short, since surveys of Norwegian GPs (see Grytten & Sørensen, 2008) show that a 
proportion of the total services is provided to patients not listed and these external consultations occur more 
frequently if a GP experiences a shortage of patients.  
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depending on the list status of the physician. While a GP in the subgroup Full on average has 
30.3 GPs with open lists in his or her municipality, a GP in the subgroup Short has 94.6 GPs 
with open lists in his or her municipality. These figures mirror both variation in capacity at the 
municipal level and variation among municipalities regarding the number of inhabitants.  In a 
municipality with high physician density, we would expect to find many open lists because of 
the large number of physicians. Hence, Capacity can be interpreted as an indicator of 
competition among GPs in the municipality. We predict that an increase in Capacity has a 
positive impact on the number of switches. 
 
4. Estimation and results  
 
For econometric analysis the Norwegian list patient system has several advantages: 
1.  There is close to 100 percent participation in the system, both among residents and 
among GPs. Hence, we need not pay attention to possible self-selection into the 
system. 
2.  Each GP’s population of patients is known. Hence, we know whether a great number 
of services provided reflects many patients in the practice or the provision of many 
services to each patient. 
3.  Fees (including the magnitude of co-payments) are negotiated between the state and 
the Norwegian Medical Association. Hence, fees are fixed for the individual GP and 
the micro level market conditions have no effect on price.  
 
We want to estimate factors that have an impact on Switch. Since we have panel data (four 
periods: 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004), unobserved heterogeneity is likely to occur. 
Unobserved heterogeneity violates the assumptions of ordinary least squares regression, since 
error terms of different periods are likely to be correlated for each GP.  We fit a standard 
model of the form
11: 
' '     + ( 1,...., ; 1,...., ) it i it i it y im tT αε =+ += = x β z γ       ( 1 0 )  
where yit is the dependent variable with a subscript indicating observation number t of GP 
number i, xit is a vector of time varying explanatory variables with a similar subscript, zi is a 
vector of time invariant variables,  β and γ are vectors of coefficients to be estimated , and αi + 
                                                 
11 See for instance Cameron and Trivedi (2005), Ch. 21.  
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εit is the stochastic error term. The stochastic variable αi is the GP specific random variable 
that captures unobserved heterogeneity and differs among GPs, but not for a particular GP 
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For the random effects model to be valid, we should also have , (, ) (,)0 ii t ii Cov x Cov z α α == . 
We test this restriction by means of a standard Hausman-test. If the restriction is rejected, the 
fixed effects model is selected. In the fixed-effects model αi cancels, and, hence, the model is 
robust. If the random effects model is valid, the random effects estimators are, however, more 
efficient than the fixed effects estimators. In addition, we are also able to test the effect of 
time-invariant variables. Since the number who Switch to another list is positively skewed, we 
use the natural logarithm of Switch in the regressions. We also enter the natural logarithm of 
all continuous right hand side variables. 
 
The independent variables that are included in the regressions correspond to the variables that 
were predicted to have an impact on Switch in the theoretical model. These variables are 
Proplist, predicted to have a negative impact on Switch; Short, predicted to have a positive 
impact on Switch; and the interaction term Feepercap*Short, predicted to have a negative 
impact on Switch
12. As control variables we introduce variables that account for variation in 
the composition of the patient list (Propold and Propfem), variation in physician 
characteristics (Male, Mid-age,  Old-age
13, Norwegian, Specialist1 and Specialist2) and 
variation in accessibility and competition at the municipal level (Capacity).  
 
                                                 
12 In supplementary analyses we used Consult and Duration as indicators of service provision. None of these 
displayed statistically significant effects and we omit them from further presentation.  
13 Age is converted to three dummy variables: Young-age equals 1 if Age < 35 and 0 otherwise; Medium-age 
equals 1 if 35 ≤ Age < 50 and 0 otherwise; Old-age equals 1 if Age ≥ 50 and 0 otherwise. Young-age is the 
reference group in the regressions.  
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Table 3.  The estimated effect (robust std) of practice characteristics and market 
conditions on the number of patients who SWITCH from a GP’s list 












** (0.08)  TVen 0.51
** (0.08) 
Gray  0.09
** (0.02)  0.23
** (0.02) TVen 0.09
** (0.02) 
Many  - 0.02 (0.04)  -0.10
** (0.03) TVen - 0.02 (0.03) 
Proplist   -  0.52
** (0.02) TIen - 1.14
** (0.23) 
Proplist *Short  - 0.20
** (0.03)  -0.02 (0.03) TVen - 0.20
** (0.03) 
Feepercap*Short  - 0.09
** (0.01)   - 0.07
** (0.01) TVex - 0.08
** (0.01)  
List  1.39
** (0.10)  0.82
** (0.03) TVex 1.28
** (0.08) 
Propold  0.07 (0.06)  - 0.002 (0.02) TVex 0.09 (0.04) 
Propfem  -0.55
* (0.21)  - 0.79
** (0.08) TVex - 0.37
* (0.17) 
Man   -  0.26
** (0.03) TIex - 0.24
* (0.12) 
Mid-age   0.11
* (0.04) TIex 0.64 (0.43) 
Old-age   0.26
** (0.05) TIex 0.86
* (0.43) 
Norwegian   -  0.18
** (0.04) TIex - 0.09 (0.14) 
Specialist1   -  0.11
** (0.02) TIen -0.38 (0.91) 




** (0.006) TVex 0.15
** (0.01) 
Med1cent   0.18
** (0.05) TIex 0.13 (0.16) 
Med2cent   0.32
** (0.04) TIex 0.16 (0.17) 
Highcent   0.31
** (0.04) TIex 0.15 (0.15) 
Constant   -  3.87




Yes Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R
2   0.30    
Number of 
observations 
8866 8866  8866 














 CHISQ(12)  = 
774.23 
p-value = 0.000
CHISQ(12) = 6.90 




**') indicates that the estimated parameter is significantly different from zero at the five (one) 
percent level with a two tailed test.  
 
TVex denotes time varying exogenous variable 
TVen denotes time varying endogenous variable 
TIex denotes time invariant exogenous variable 




Fixed effects estimation 
Table 3 shows the results from the regression analyses. As shown in the bottom line of the 
table, the Hausman test rejects the random effects model. The results of the fixed effects 
estimation show a statistically significant effect with the expected sign of Short on Switch. 
The magnitude of the estimated effect is 0.52, meaning that occurrence of patient shortage 
(Short) is estimated to increase the number of switches (Switch) from a GP’s list by 52 
percent.  From the interaction term Proplist*Short we see that a high proportion of patients 
having the GP as first choice contributes to a decline in switches (Switch) for GPs with a 
shortage of patients.   The estimated coefficient of Feepercap*Short shows the effect on 
switching (Switch) of an increase in the level of service provision for GPs who experience 
patient shortage. The effect is statistically significant and has the expected sign. But the 
magnitude of the effect is very small. An elasticity of - 0.09 means that a one per cent 
increase in service provision (Feepercap) is expected to decrease the magnitude of switching 
(Switch) by 0.09 percent. Hence, if GPs experiencing patient shortage increase the sum of fees 
per person by NOK 100 (22 percent increase from the mean for Short), the number of 
switches is predicted to decline by 2 percent or between one and two persons per year per list 
(calculated from mean of Switch from group Short).  Hence, an increase in the intensity of 
service provision does not seem to have an effect of any practical interest to the physician. We 
have also done the regressions with lagged values of service provision without having any 
change in results.  
 
The proportion of females on a list (Propfem) contributes to a lower number of switches 
(Switch). This may reflect females, in general, being more loyal patients. Another hypothesis 
might be more plausible: Females often have a preference for a female GP. Since female GPs 
are a minority, female patients have fewer options available.  We also see that the number of 
physicians in the municipality who accept new patients (Capacity) has a positive impact on 
the number of patients who switch, as predicted. The magnitude of the effect is not very great. 
If the number of GPs with open lists increases by 10 percent from the mean (61.3), the 
number of switches (Switch) is estimated to increase by 1.8 percent or between one and two 
persons per list per year.    
 
Hausman- Taylor estimation 
Since the fixed effects method only makes use of the within variation of each GP, the effect of 
the time invariant variables is not estimated. Hence, the effect of a core variable in the study,  
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Proplist, is included in the fixed effect and cannot be estimated separately. To overcome this 
problem Hausman and Taylor (1981) suggest an instrumental variable approach. We start out 
(Green, 2003, p. 303) by splitting the vectors of explanatory variables in (10) into: 
'' '
11 22 1 ,     + + ( 1,...., ; 1,...., ) it i it it i i t y im tT αε =+ + + = =
'
12 i 2 x β x β z γ z γ     ( 1 1 )  
where  
x1it is K1 variables that are time varying and uncorrelated with αi 
z1it is L1 variables that are time invariant and uncorrelated with αi 
x2it is K2 variables that are time varying and correlated with αi 
z2it is L2 variables that are time invariant and correlated with αi 
The method contains the following steps. In step 1 β1 and β2 are estimated by fixed effects 
estimation. The residual variance estimator from this regression is a consistent estimator of 
2
ε σ . In step 2 the group means of the residuals, eit, are formed and denoted i e . These group 
means are used as dependent variables in an instrumental variable regression where z1 is used 
as instrumental variable for itself and x1 as instrument for z2. Identification requires that K1 ≥ 
L2. The residual variance in this regression is a consistent estimator of 
*2 2 2 /T αε σσ σ =+ . 
Since we now can derive an estimator of
2
α σ , we can calculate the weight for feasible GLS by 












The final step is a weighted instrumental variable estimation. The instrument set consists of 
deviations from individual means of time-varying variables, individual means of exogenous 
time-varying variables and levels of exogenous time-invariant variables: 
11 22 1 1 (( ),( ), , ) it it it it i it −− xxxxz x . 
 
A challenge with Hausman-Taylor estimation is that one has to specify whether or not a 
specific variable is considered to be correlated or uncorrelated with the individual latent 
variable, αi.  We find it likely that αi manifests physician quality as perceived by patients. 
Hence, we find it plausible that the time varying variables Short,  Gray,  Many and 
Proplist*Short are correlated with αi. Additionally, we assume that the time invariant variable 
Proplist is endogenous since a physician with whom many patients would like to be listed, is 
likely to have a high value of the latent quality characteristics. Specialist1 is considered to be  
  22
endogenous since being a specialist in general medicine signals a concern for quality that is 
likely to be positively correlated with αi. In order to avoid the weak instrument problem there 
should be sufficient correlation between a variable that is instrumented and the instrument. 
We find that both Proplist and Specialist1 are reasonably well correlated with the time 
varying exogenous variables. 
 
The last column of Table 3 shows the results from the Hausman-Taylor estimation. From the 
Hausman test we see that the model is not rejected. The estimates of the time varying 
variables exhibit the same signs and level of statistical significance as in the fixed effects 
estimation, and the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients are quite similar. The effect of 
Proplist is statistically significant and negative: A one percent increase in Proplist is 
estimated to reduce the number of switches by 1.14 percent. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
This study is concerned with three issues. First, we question whether the information patients 
have about physician quality when they choose a physician influences the probability of 
switching physicians. Second, we examine whether physicians with a shortage of patients 
experience more patient switching than others and third, we test whether a physician with 
unfavorable characteristics as perceived by patients, can prevent patient switching by 
providing a higher quantity of services to his or her patients.  
 
The results of the empirical studies are mainly in accordance with our theory. A physician 
with many people having him or her as the first choice when the list system was established, 
experiences less patient switching than less popular physicians. People who were allocated to 
their preferred GP had experience with the practice style, and ranked this GP first because 
they trusted him or her and felt confident about the way their health problems were handled 
(Kalda et al. 2003, Hjortdahl and Lærum 1992). On the other hand, people who did not get 
their preferred GP, were less informed about their assigned GP’s medical quality, and hence, 
more likely to be disappointed and switch to another physician. Hence, we show that 
information on physician quality influences the volume of patients switching physicians. 
  
We also find that GPs who experience a shortage of patients experience more patient 
switching than GPs with enough patients. This is both in accordance with theory and with  
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results from our previous nationwide survey where we found that patient shortage is related to 
patient dissatisfaction (Lurås 2007). Dissatisfaction results in ‘exit’ in terms of switching, i.e. 
patients reveal their preferences by switching GPs. Physicians who experience patient 
shortage seem to have some characteristics related to personality or practice style that the 
population in general does not like. Hence, experiencing patient shortage is not only a matter 
of technical allocation of patients to GPs, but also signals characteristics of a GP.  
 
From theory we predicted that physicians with a shortage of patients would compensate for 
unfavorable characteristics by providing more services, such as longer and more frequent 
consultations, to their patients. Our third result is that a higher level of service provision only 
has a very small impact on the number of patients who decide to switch, i.e. more services do 
not compensate for characteristics of physicians that patients dislike. Hence, it seems that 
benefits are less than costs at the margin, and the extra service provision the constrained GPs 
offer may be socially inefficient. 
 
Harris (2003) surveyed a random sample of individuals between the ages of 21 and 64 with 
employer-related health benefits, drawn from a nationally representative panel of households. 
She concludes that despite predictions of the increasing importance of consumer choice in 
shaping the health care delivery system, patients are passive health care consumers of 
physician services (see also Salisbury, 1989). In contrast, our results imply that both people’s 
choice of a physician and the decision to stay with a GP or switch to another, are thoroughly 
considered and related to the perceived quality of a GP. This finding finds support in the 
medical literature (see for instance Gandhi et al. 1997 and Wolinsky et al. 1982). 
 
In Norway a GP’s actual number and maximum number of patients are both posted at the 
internet page of the NIA. A recommendation to a person who has only the publicly available 
information when he considers switching physicians would be to choose the physician with 
the smallest difference between maximum and actual list size.   The problem is, of course, that 
a physician’s maximum list size is a magnitude that is determined by the physician. If patients 
stopped switching to physicians with great deficits of patients, these physicians would reduce 
their preferred list size, and the advice would not be of much worth. A more viable suggestion 
would perhaps be to publish the number of switches a physician experiences during a defined 
period. This measure could have two virtues: Switching decisions would be better informed 
and physicians would be encouraged to invest in quality to prevent patients from switching.  
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An additional virtue is perhaps that physicians would not be encouraged to provide wasteful 
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Figure A1.  No. added to the list according to year and GP’s list status (No. observations 
= 10,859) 
 